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Left To Languish: The Importance of Expanding 
the Due Process Rights of Immigration Detainees 
Maisie A. Baldwin∗ 
  INTRODUCTION   
Due process of law, a core principle of American jurispru-
dence, has been under constant scrutiny and review since its 
formal recognition in the Bill of Rights.1 Though the contours of 
due process have been fleshed out in a number of settings—
particularly in criminal law—the scope of due process protec-
tions has not been holistically evaluated in the civil context. As 
a result, various civil processes—sex offender registration,2 civ-
il confinement as an alternative to criminal sanctions,3 inclu-
sion on the No-Fly List,4 and immigration detention—are now 
facing due process challenges. Courts are grappling with ques-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would 
like to thank my colleagues at the James H. Binger Center for New Americans 
for inspiring and focusing the topic of this Note. Special thanks to Linus Chan 
and Regina Jefferies for enabling me to experience immigration detention first 
hand, and teaching me about both problems and solutions therein. Thanks al-
so to the excellent staff and editors of Minnesota Law Review for their feed-
back and to my family for their unending support. Copyright © 2018 by Maisie 
A. Baldwin. 
 1. See, e.g., Francis W. Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1913); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 
(1999); Hugh Evander Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States 
Constitution, 74 U. PENN. L. REV. 331, 334–39 (1926); Ryan Williams, Substan-
tive Due Process in Historical Context, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 10, 2012), https:// 
www.cato-unbound.org/2012/02/10/ryan-williams/substantive-due-process 
-historical-context. 
 2. Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due 
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1451, 1453 (1999) (describing the due process issues with sex offender 
registries and failures of courts to address these issues). 
 3. A case addressing this issue was recently decided by the Eighth Cir-
cuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 
394, 398 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106 (2017) (mem.). 
 4. Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925, at *1 (D. Or. 
2016). 
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tions that the criminal justice system answered decades ago: 
When, if ever, should a civil litigant have a right to counsel? 
How much notice must the government give individuals facing 
civil penalties? To what extent should civil litigants be able to 
challenge the government’s factual basis for civil penalties? 
These questions all aim at the same inquiry: What level of due 
process should civilian litigants in a civil suit against the gov-
ernment be given? 
This Note will answer the question of how much process 
ought to be due to respondents in immigration proceedings. Af-
ter understanding the mechanics of immigration detention and 
removal proceedings in the United States, it becomes clear that 
immigration detainees ought to be given due process rights 
similar to criminal defendants. Most importantly, immigration 
detainees ought to be given meaningful access to the courts. 
Under the current U.S. immigration system, many nonciti-
zens are placed into immigration proceedings after being 
charged with relatively minor crimes.5 In a growing number of 
instances, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) works 
with local and state law enforcement to identify noncitizens 
who may be eligible for deportation.6 As a result, any nonciti-
zen who makes contact with the criminal justice system—
whether through traffic stops, misdemeanor offenses, or proba-
tion violations—may be civilly detained by ICE. While in immi-
gration detention, these individuals are evaluated for place-
ment into removal proceedings. 
 
 5. There are significant difficulties in tracking what crimes individuals 
in deportation proceedings have been charged with or convicted of. However, 
noncitizens with a range of charges and convictions face deportation. Teresa 
Wiltz, What Crimes Are Eligible for Deportation?, PEW CHARITABLE TR.: 
STATELINE (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and 
-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/12/21/what-crimes-are-eligible-for-deportation 
(“We see a ton of people deported for misdemeanors, probation violations, pet-
ty theft, [and] shoplifting.” (quoting Alisa Wellek, Executive Director of the 
Immigrant Defense Project)). 
 6. For a description of the cooperation between local law enforcement 
and ICE officials, see How ICE Uses Local Criminal Justice Systems To Fun-
nel People into the Detention and Deportation System, NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
LAW CTR. (Mar. 2014), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/ 
localjusticeandice. Cf. FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE ROLE OF 
STATE & LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION MATTERS AND REASONS 
TO RESIST SANCTUARY POLICIES 1 (2016) (arguing that local-federal partner-
ships between police and ICE officers are beneficial). 
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Over 2.1 million noncitizens were removed from the United 
States between 2010 and 2015.7 Depending on the number of 
criminal charges and convictions, as well as the category of of-
fense, a noncitizen may be held by ICE in a detention center af-
ter serving their criminal sentences for months—in a growing 
number of instances, years—while they wait to learn the out-
come of their immigration proceedings.8 While it is difficult to 
know the exact portion of noncitizens who were held in prisons 
or jails throughout the duration of their immigration proceed-
ings, large numbers of individuals in immigration proceedings 
face mandatory detention;9 in other words, they are held for 
months without a bond hearing10 on the basis of past criminal 
convictions after their criminal sentences have been complet-
ed.11 Even immigration detainees who are eligible for bond 
hearings are given limited resources and information about the 
process.12 Though immigration judges are guided by statutory 
factors, decisions regarding bond are often left to one immigra-
tion judge’s sole discretion.13 
 
 7. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF ’T, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND 
REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2 fig.1 (2016). 
 8. See How a “Dire” Immigration Court Backlog Affects Lives, PBS: 
NEWSHOUR (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/dire 
-immigration-court-backlog-affects-lives (reporting that as of September 2017, 
“[t]he average wait time [for a merits-based immigration] hearing is 672 days, 
nearly two years”). 
 9. Two laws passed in 1996 established the modern scope of mandatory 
immigration detention: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. These acts 
each categorize certain offenses and trigger mandatory detention when the 
statutory requirements are met. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
 10. For circumstances under which an individual is not given a bond hear-
ing, see Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 § 303. 
 11. See Mandatory Detention: When Immigration and Customs May Hold 
a Noncitizen Without Bond, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/ 
mandatory-detention-immigration-customs-hold-noncitizen-without-bond.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018). For a critical view of the premise that certain 
noncitizens can be held without bond, see Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by 
Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 
149, 149–50 (2004). 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)–(c) (2012). Decisions regarding bond made by im-
migration judges and affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals are not 
reviewable in the judicial system. Id. § 1226(e). The Attorney General may 
take any actions he/she deems appropriate, including raising the amount of 
bond or revoking it altogether. Id. § 1226(b). 
 13. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a)–(h), 1236.1(d) (2017). 
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Indigent immigration detainees are not guaranteed access 
to a government-provided attorney at any stage of their pro-
ceedings.14 They are not guaranteed access to up-to-date coun-
try condition reports, which can be a central piece of certain 
claims for relief.15 And some immigration detainees never have 
the opportunity to plead their cases before judges—instead, 
they are sent to their country of citizenship through a stipulat-
ed removal program.16 In short, immigration detainees are not 
guaranteed the same level of access to the courts that criminal 
defendants are constitutionally assured. 
This Note argues that certain constitutional protections 
currently afforded to criminal defendants should be extended to 
individuals in immigration proceedings in the form of meaning-
ful access to the courts. Part I will explain the development of 
the access-to-the-courts standard in criminal case law and de-
tail how criminal detention facilities meet this standard. Then, 
it will explore the historic development and current status of 
immigration detention. Part II will highlight the shortcomings 
of current efforts to protect the rights of immigration detainees. 
Part III will illustrate how the access-to-the-courts standard 
may look in immigration proceedings. Part III will argue in fa-
vor of expanding the current minimum-level protections for 
immigration detainees. It will assert that by providing immi-
gration detainees access to the courts in the form of law librar-
ies, a host of benefits will follow. It will address the most press-
ing concerns with immigration law libraries, and introduce 
solutions to these problems. To conclude, Part III will identify 
the role that different actors could play to improve immigrants’ 
access to the courts, and explain how these actors can work to-
gether to make meaningful change. 
 
 14. Immigration detainees have “the privilege of being represented (at no 
expense to the Government).” 8 U.S.C. § 1362. Put another way, immigration 
detainees are given the opportunity to have counsel, but those who cannot af-
ford an attorney or find a volunteer attorney do not have representation. 
 15. See Patrick G. Lee, Immigrants in Detention Centers Are Often Hun-
dreds of Miles from Legal Help, PROPUBLICA (May 16, 2017), https://www 
.propublica.org/article/immigrants-in-detention-centers-are-often-hundreds-of 
-miles-from-legal-help. 
 16. While this program only reaches a narrow class of immigration de-
tainees, these individuals are not given the opportunity to consult with inde-
pendent counsel or appear in court. For a detailed description of the program, 
its scope, and its implications, see JENNIFER L. KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, at iii (2011), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/02/Deportation-Without-Due-Process-2011-09.pdf. 
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I.  LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN EXPLORATION 
OF HOW CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
CAME TO BE, AND HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
GOT LEFT BEHIND   
Imprisoning an individual is among the most serious in-
fringements of fundamental rights that a government may im-
pose upon its citizens.17 Throughout the history of the United 
States, legislatures and judiciaries alike have worked to bal-
ance the interests of the government with the rights of the im-
prisoned.18 This balance is crucial when dealing with criminal 
detainees whose cases have not yet been resolved. Accused de-
fendants in the criminal justice system are therefore provided 
with a myriad of protections of their rights: law libraries so 
that they may meaningfully participate in the court system,19 a 
right to reasonable bail,20 and a right to court-appointed coun-
sel if deemed indigent.21 Taken together, these guarantees aim 
to provide criminal defendants access to the courts in order to 
ensure a more fair adversarial process. Detention in the immi-
 
 17. The Supreme Court has recognized that incarceration is a serious 
enough deprivation of fundamental freedom that it must be heavily con-
strained by due process. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause . . . .” (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982))). For a critique that the federal government does not 
take the deprivation of liberty that accompanies imprisonment seriously 
enough, see Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right 
Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 783 (1994). 
 18. See, e.g., Emily Chiang, The Turner Standard: Balancing Constitu-
tional Rights & Governmental Interests in Prison, U.C. IRVINE L. FOR. J., Fall 
2007, at 1, 2. 
 19. In Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental 
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist 
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing 
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons 
trained in the law.” 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). 
 20. The right to have a bond set is not absolute, and different states may 
establish different criteria for formulating the cost of bond. For an overview of 
how the perception and role of pretrial bond in criminal cases has morphed 
throughout history, see Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment 
and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329 
(1982). It is also worth noting that a number of bond systems are currently be-
ing challenged as constitutionally insufficient. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harris 
Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 714 (S.D. Tex. 2016). 
 21. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (holding that the 
federal right to counsel for indigent clients extends to defendants in state 
courts as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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gration context mirrors the criminal detention system,22 yet it 
does not provide corollary protections for its detainees.23 
Section A will describe how the access-to-the-courts stand-
ard developed within the criminal system. It will evaluate the 
role that courts have played in establishing prisoner protec-
tions, and discuss the tension that courts face when balancing 
prisoners’ rights with other governmental interests. Section B 
will describe the immigration detention system, focusing on the 
ways in which it resembles the criminal detention system. Be-
cause of the parallels between the criminal and immigration 
detention systems, this Part will conclude that the need for 
parallel protections is apparent. 
A. THE HISTORY OF PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE COURTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
1. The Origins of Court-Mandated Due Process Protections 
The contours of the American criminal justice system 
changed significantly throughout the twentieth century. State 
and federal courts grappled with cases regarding the scope of 
the right to due process. From protections for people with men-
tal illness24 to the constitutionality of the death penalty25 to the 
guarantee of counsel,26 the criminal system was challenged, 
questioned, critiqued, and reformed during this time. 
 
 22. In fact, the two systems are, in many respects, not distinguishable. As 
officials within ICE recognize, “[a]ll but a few of the facilities that ICE uses to 
detain aliens were built as jails and prisons.” DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION & CUSTOMS ENF ’T, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 21 (2009), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/ 
docs/immigration-detention-overview-and-recommendations/original.pdf. The 
report highlights similarities between the criminal and immigration detainees, 
yet argues that ICE ought to reconsider treating the populations as synony-
mous. Id. at 4. 
 23. See id. at 22 (arguing that “[n]umerous changes could be made to im-
prove the care and management of the [immigration] detainee population”). 
Examples of proposed changes include taking immigration detainee com-
plaints more seriously, improving transitions between facilities, improved rec-
ord-keeping, better mental health monitoring, and better opportunities for 
immigration detainees to engage in their own legal proceedings. Id. at 22–25. 
 24. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990) (holding, in 
part, that forced medication orders implicate due process concerns). 
 25. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam); 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 
390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 91 (1958). 
 26. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339–41 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel is fundamental to a fair trial, and is therefore applicable in all state 
criminal justice systems). 
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Starting in 1941, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
fairness of the criminal justice system relies, in part, on both 
the defendant and the prosecution having the ability to mean-
ingfully engage in the judicial process.27 In Ex Parte Hull, the 
Court held that limiting an inmate’s ability to file writs or mo-
tions with the court violates due process.28 This battle to en-
sure access to the courts continued for decades to come, mani-
festing in a myriad of ways. Certain criminal defendants were 
no longer required to pay docket fees.29 Courts ensured the 
right to counsel at trial.30 Legislatures and courts nationwide 
worked to implement changes within the American criminal 
justice system that would ensure all defendants were given 
their constitutionally protected rights.31 
2. The Start of the Meaningful Access Standard 
Then, in 1977, the Supreme Court of the United States 
heard a case that further challenged the nature of criminal de-
tention.32 Three inmates within the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Correction filed a claim that officers had infringed on 
their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.33 The inmates 
“alleged . . . that they were denied access to the courts in viola-
tion of their Fourteenth Amendment rights by the State’s fail-
ure to provide legal research facilities.”34 Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court agreed with the prisoners, holding that “the 
 
 27. Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548 (1941) (holding that a state may not 
hinder an individual’s efforts to file petitions or motions with a court). 
 28. Id. For a discussion of the historical impact of this case, and how it 
shaped future jurisprudence related to due process, see Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2117 (2009). 
 29. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1959). While particular court 
fees must be waived, in recent years, courts have demonstrated a renewed in-
terest in ensuring that criminal defendants pay. For a critical analysis of this 
trend, see Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, 
NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing 
-court-fees-punish-the-poor. 
 30. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339–41. This right to counsel was also extend-
ed for indigent defendants who were guaranteed an appeal as a matter of 
right. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). 
 31. For a description of some of the measures taken throughout the twen-
tieth century, see Charles McClain & Dan M. Kahan, Criminal Law Reform: 
Historical Development in the United States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & 
JUSTICE 412, 421–25 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 32. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 33. Id. at 818. 
 34. Id. 
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fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts re-
quires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation 
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners 
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from per-
sons trained in the law.”35 
Bounds v. Smith recognized prisoners’ constitutional right 
to access the courts, and that providing law libraries was one of 
many ways that prison systems could ensure that access.36 
Some scholars have critiqued this case because it failed to 
mandate a particular method of ensuring prisoners had access 
to the courts.37 Even in light of the open-ended standard of 
Bounds,38 the case marked a pivot toward stronger due process 
protections for criminal detainees. 
Nearly twenty years later, the Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the constitutional requirements of prisoner access to 
the courts.39 In Lewis v. Casey, a group of prisoners initiated a 
class action suit, alleging that they were not being provided 
with constitutionally adequate legal resources that the Court 
guaranteed under Bounds.40 The Supreme Court held that a 
prerequisite to making a Bounds-based claim was a showing of 
actual, systemic injury—something the class in Lewis v. Casey 
failed to allege.41 The Lewis v. Casey holding triggered signifi-
cant debate about the future of due process for those in jail 
 
 35. Id. at 828. 
 36. While the Court did not rule that law libraries were the only method 
of preserving access to the courts, the Court did find that law libraries were 
sufficient to meet the constitutional minimum. See id. at 825–26. 
 37. For an example of such a critique, see generally Christopher E. Smith, 
Examining the Boundaries of Bounds: Prison Law Libraries and Access to the 
Courts, 30 HOW. L.J. 27 (1987). 
 38. The Court in Bounds “noted that while adequate law libraries are one 
constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts,” 
the decision did “not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal.” 430 
U.S. at 830. The Court elaborated: 
Among the alternatives are the training of inmates as paralegal assis-
tants to work under lawyers’ supervision, the use of paraprofessionals 
and law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical programs, 
the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or 
other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, 
and the use of full-time staff attorneys, working in either new prison 
legal assistance organizations or as part of public defender or legal 
services offices. 
Id. at 831. 
 39. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 349. The Court used the status of the case as a class action in 
order to define the class’s desired remedy. Id. at 357. 
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awaiting trial, but remains the seminal case on what consti-
tutes meaningful access to the courts.42 
In the years since the Court rendered its decision in Lewis 
v. Casey, federal courts nationwide have heard several cases 
seeking clarification about the access-to-the-courts standard. 
For example, in 2002 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that law 
libraries alone could meet the constitutional demands of due 
process protections.43 The access-to-the-courts doctrine has 
been curtailed in many federal court decisions throughout the 
past two decades.44 In 2016, for instance, a federal district 
court reasoned that while access to the courts is important, 
there are pragmatic limitations to which resources prisons are 
constitutionally required to provide.45 
Many federal district courts have echoed this sentiment, 
understanding that though Lewis v. Casey imposes some obli-
gation on the prison system to enable prisoners to file certain 
petitions and documents to a court, the right is not absolute or 
limitless. In fact, many scholars have critiqued the legacy of 
Lewis v. Casey, arguing that federal due process protections 
have been paradoxically diminished in the era since the Su-
preme Court recognized that prisoners have a constitutional 
right to access the courts.46 
 
 42. As an initial reaction to the case, some scholars contended that Lewis 
v. Casey sharply curtailed the access-to-the-courts requirement of previous 
precedent. See, e.g., David Steinberger, Note, Lewis v. Casey: Tightening the 
Boundaries of Prisoner Access to the Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 377, 378–79 
(1998); see also Joseph L. Gerken, Does Lewis v. Casey Spell the End to Court-
Ordered Improvement of Prison Law Libraries?, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 491, 491–92 
(2003). 
 43. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002). 
 44. Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
court-appointed counsel alone was sufficient to meet due process require-
ments, and that access to additional legal resources was not necessary); Hul-
lum v. Maloney, 1999 WL 1338078, *2 (1st Cir. 1999) (requiring that prisoners 
show the claims they were prevented from bringing were not frivolous); Jack-
son v. Hughes, 2011 WL 6090101, *6 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (holding that actions 
that interfere with prisoner access to the courts do not alone constitute a due 
process violation—a successful challenge must allege that the interference 
must prohibit an inmate from engagement with the courts). 
 45. See Velazquez-Ortiz v. Negron-Fernandez, 174 F. Supp. 3d 653, 663–
64 (D.P.R. 2016). 
 46. See generally Gerken, supra note 42; Christopher E. Smith, The Mal-
leability of Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic Impact on Prisoners’ Rights, 
11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 93–94 (2001). 
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3. The Tension Between Federal Specificity and State 
Flexibility 
Since Lewis v. Casey, courts across the United States have 
grappled with defining due process and deciding if and when 
the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution are met in a 
given court proceeding. In a nation comprised of fifty different 
states, each with its own unique values, legislatures, and con-
stituents, it is hard for the Supreme Court to produce a one-
size-fits-all guide to due process. And, in fact, the federal courts 
have left the devil of the details to states: the Supreme Court 
has provided a list of factors for states to consider, and has de-
termined that certain resources were insufficient in a given 
case without providing a narrow proscription of what states 
must do.47 
The state-by-state variation—and frequently the facility-
to-facility variation—regarding standards for prison law librar-
ies has been of some concern.48 For instance, some states have 
considered budgetary changes that would eliminate prison law 
libraries altogether, relying in large part on the difficulty of 
bringing a successful court challenge regarding access to the 
courts.49 Others are devoting resources to improve the quality 
of other services that prisoners receive.50 Despite the varied 
levels of protection across the country, certain scholars are call-
ing for courts to play a more active role in ensuring prisoners 
receive a basic level of information relating to what the laws 
 
 47. For example, in Christopher v. Harbury, the Supreme Court noted the 
wide range of desired remedies for prisoners who allege their access to the 
courts has been unconstitutionally infringed. 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002). 
 48. Jonathan Abel, Ineffective Assistance of Library: The Failings and Fu-
ture of Prison Law Libraries, 101 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1181–82 (2013) (noting a sig-
nificant difference between the law libraries in New York and Illinois in the 
1950s). 
 49. States who have pursued this course of action include Washington, 
Arizona, Idaho, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina. Diane K. Campbell, The 
Context of the Information Behavior of Prison Inmates, 26 PROGRESSIVE LIBR. 
18, 26 (2005). 
 50. The New York Public Library, for example, has started a volunteer 
outreach program in response to the low level of librarians that staff the pris-
on law libraries in the state. A study of this program revealed benefits both to 
incarcerated individuals and those who served as reference librarians in the 
flagship project. See Debbie Rabina & Emily Drabinski, Reference Services to 
Incarcerated People, Part II: Sources and Learning Outcomes, 55 REFERENCE 
& USER SERVS. Q. 123, 123–24, 129 (2015). 
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are, avenues for appeal, and procedural requirements for seek-
ing relief.51 
Presently, the nature of criminal detention and access to 
the courts can be summarized by three general observations. 
First, prisoners who are being held either before or after crimi-
nal convictions have a right to access the courts—a right which 
is rooted primarily in the Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion. Second, access to the courts can be satisfied in a variety of 
ways, though it is typically satisfied through some form of a 
law library, be it digital or physical. Finally, fundamental fair-
ness requires that defendants in criminal cases have legal re-
sources in order to meaningfully participate in their own trials, 
including searching for post-conviction relief, where attorneys 
are not guaranteed. 
B. IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
This Section will describe certain central tenants of the 
American immigration system. While this system is constantly 
in flux based on a number of domestic and international fac-
tors, there are certain components of the immigration system 
that have remained relatively constant throughout the past few 
decades. This Section will begin by discussing the origins of 
how and why the federal government detains noncitizens who 
are in removal proceedings. It will then explain a number of 
similarities between the immigration detention system and the 
criminal detention system. 
1. The Right To Detain for Purely Immigration Purposes 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1889 decision in The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, immigration proceedings to remove noncitizens 
from the United States have been considered civil, rather than 
 
 51. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert, American Prisoners 
and the Right of Access to the Courts: A Vanishing Concept of Protection, in 4 
THE AMERICAN PRISON: ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 65, 82–84 (Lynne 
Goodstein & Doris L. MacKenzie eds., 1989) (suggesting that the judicial bar-
riers imposed on prisoner litigation have increased the costs and workload 
borne by the judicial system); see also Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in 
the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
271, 277–80 (2010) (criticizing the lack of resources available to detained liti-
gants); Michael J. Sabath & William Payne, Providing Inmate Access to the 
Courts: U.S. Prison Strategies for Complying with Constitutional Rights, 92 
PRISON J. 45 (2011) (analyzing the current level of access to the courts across 
facilities and identifying shortcomings thereof). 
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criminal, in nature.52 And because the executive branch has the 
power to remove noncitizens, the executive branch also has the 
incidental authority to civilly detain noncitizens pending the 
outcome of their removal proceedings.53 As a result of this civil 
classification, immigration detainees are afforded significantly 
fewer constitutional protections than individuals in criminal 
detention.54 Often, noncitizens who have been convicted of a 
crime complete their criminal sentences and are immediately 
placed into immigration detention until the completion of their 
immigration proceedings.55 Other times, individuals are placed 
in immigration detention after law enforcement becomes aware 
of their immigration status.56 The immigration detention pro-
 
 52. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581, 609–10 (1889). Courts have maintained this perspective in the mod-
ern era. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). For further support, 
see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728–30 (1893) (observing 
that removal proceedings have “all the elements of a civil case” and are “in no 
proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime or offense”). 
 53. The Government of the United States has stated that immigration de-
tention is necessary for the “administrative purpose of holding, processing, 
and preparing [immigration detainees] for removal.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-38, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS 
COULD STRENGTHEN DHS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ABUSE 8 (2013). 
 54. See infra Part II.A. It is worth mentioning here that not all legal 
scholars agree that immigration proceedings are properly classified as civil. 
For instance, during oral arguments in Sessions v. Dimaya, many Justices 
questioned the wisdom of continuing to define immigration proceedings as civ-
il. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, 11–12, 38–39, Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 
15-1498, (U.S. argued Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/15-1498_886b.pdf. 
 55. This program is an effort to engage local- and state-level law enforce-
ment with federal immigration officials. The program, as well as other ICE-
police alliance programs, have been the subject of a number of academic stud-
ies. See, e.g., Tom K. Wong, 287(g) and the Politics of Interior Immigration 
Control in the United States: Explaining Local Cooperation with Federal Im-
migration Authorities, 38 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 737, 752 (2012) (ana-
lyzing statistical data about community safety in 287(g) and non-287(g) com-
pliant communities); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The 
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal 
Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 312–14 (2011) (analyzing the ability of states to assist 
with federal immigration enforcement). 
 56. While exact statistics regarding the frequency of this method of immi-
gration enforcement, a number of communities have reported the impact that 
this program has had on their communities. See Seth Freed Wessler, Days of 
Deportation: Sixty Scenes of Immigration Enforcement in the Age of Trump, 
SLATE (June 15, 2017), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/06/ 
immigration-enforcement-in-trumps-america-one-day-at-a-time.html; Paul Vi-
tello, Path to Deportation Can Start with a Traffic Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/14/nyregion/path-to-deportation-can 
-start-with-a-traffic-stop.html; Esther Yu Hsi Lee, Traffic Stops in Georgia Are 
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cess, therefore, can act as an extension of a criminal sentence 
or as an independent civil enforcement mechanism. 
However, immigration detainees are increasingly treated 
the same as criminal detainees.57 For example, immigration de-
tainees are often housed within preexisting prisons or jails, and 
in many ways, immigration detainees must abide by the same 
rules and restrictions on their freedom as criminal detainees.58 
2. Distinguishing Immigration Detainees and Criminal 
Detainees: A Difference in Name Only? 
The line between immigration and criminal violations is 
not often clear. Many immigration violations, such as providing 
false information to police officers or using falsified documents, 
are now violations of criminal statutes.59 In a similar vein, 
criminal lawyers are required to consider how criminal pro-
ceedings might impact their clients’ immigration statuses.60 
Due to cooperation between some state-level law enforcement 
agencies and federal immigration officers, noncitizens are fre-
 
Leaving Children Without Their Immigrant Parents, THINKPROGRESS (June 
23, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/traffic-stops-georgia-immigrant-parents 
-children-123edd436942. 
 57. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
469, 489–96 (2007) (noting the increased use of detention for detainees along 
with the use of police and judges to enforcement immigration laws). Even ICE, 
the agency charged with maintaining immigration facilities, has conceded that 
immigration and criminal detention are mirror images of one another. SCHRI-
RO, supra note 22, at 4.  
 58. See MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EX-
PANDING I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX, 115–16 (2002). 
 59. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2012). For a further discussion of the ex-
panding immigration consequences related to identity documents, see Paris 
Lee, Fake Driver License and False Documents Can Raise Fraud Issues with 
Immigration, LEE & GARASIA: IMMIGR. L. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www 
.njimmigrationattorney.com/blog/2015/02/fake-driver-license-and-false 
-documents-can-raise-fraud-issues-with-immigration.shtml. 
Between 1984 and 1994, criminal convictions for immigration-related of-
fenses nearly tripled in the United States. Helen Morris, Zero Tolerance: The 
Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
1317, 1318, 1320 (1997). This increased overlap between criminal law and 
immigration law has led some scholars to use the term crimmigration to de-
scribe the disappearing distinction between the two systems. See, e.g., Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2006). 
 60. The requirement was articulated in Padilla v. Kentucky, a case in 
which the Supreme Court held that criminal lawyers have an obligation to in-
form non-U.S. citizens of the potential immigration-related consequences of 
either a plea deal or a guilty verdict. 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
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quently transported immediately from criminal detention to 
immigration detention for removal proceedings.61 One of these 
programs, called the Criminal Alien Program, encourages jail 
and prison officials to alert ICE if any suspected noncitizens 
are in their facilities.62 While reporting noncitizens to ICE is 
optional for jails and prisons, the Criminal Alien Program is 
currently “the program responsible for the largest number of 
immigrant apprehensions” by ICE.63 
As a result of the Criminal Alien Program, in conjunction 
with other immigration priorities that have targeted nonciti-
zens who encounter the American criminal justice system, it 
has become more difficult to distinguish immigration detainees 
and criminal ones.64 This is particularly true in light of the fact 
that an increasing number of facilities house criminal and im-
migration detainees side-by-side.65 
Because of the modern landscape of immigration detention, 
particularly the significant similarities between immigration 
and criminal detention, it is important to ask whether it makes 
sense to continue to treat immigration detention and its corre-
sponding court hearings as fully civil proceedings. The conse-
quences of calling immigration proceedings civil are far-
reaching. Perhaps the most significant consequence is the fail-
ure to provide individuals in removal proceedings with the 
comprehensive due process protections provided to criminal de-
fendants, particularly access to the courts. The meaningful ac-
cess-to-the-courts standard has found significance in the crimi-
 
 61. See Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF ’T, 
https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
 62. See id. (click on the “Key Initiatives” tab). 
 63. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in 
Prisons and Jails, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www 
.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/criminal-alien-program-cap 
-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails. 
 64. See, e.g., Gretchen Gavett, Map: The U.S. Immigration Detention 
Boom, FRONTLINE (Oct. 18, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/ 
map-the-u-s-immigration-detention-boom; Daniel M. Kowalski, ICE Detainers 
Unlawful: Jimenez Moreno v. Napolitano, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM: 
IMMIGR. L. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/ 
immigration/b/newsheadlines/archive/2016/10/03/ice-detainers-unlawful 
-jimenez-moreno-v-napolitano.aspx?Redirected=true; Editorial Bd., Detention: 
Yet Another Immigration Policy in Need of Reform, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2014), 
http://www.startribune.com/detention-yet-another-immigration-policy-in-need 
-of-reform/255828941. 
 65. USA: Jailed Without Justice, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 26, 2011), https:// 
www.amnestyusa.org/reports/usa-jailed-without-justice. 
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nal system, and it is time that the immigration detention sys-
tem similarly protects basic tenets of fairness. 
II.  SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION SYSTEM   
This Part will detail a number of the problematic aspects of 
immigration detention. It will begin by discussing how the lack 
of a constitutional right to counsel for indigent detainees im-
pacts their ability to meaningfully argue their cases before im-
migration judges. Section A will detail a number of common 
points of contention and debate in the discussion surrounding 
government-provided counsel for immigration detention. Then, 
Section B will identify some of the modern administrative fail-
ures of the immigration system. Finally, Section C will describe 
existing prison law libraries, and why the status quo fails to 
meet the needs of immigration detainees. 
A. THE LACK OF AVAILABLE COUNSEL AND ITS IMPACT ON 
IMMIGRATION DETAINEES 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court announced 
that the Sixth Amendment required that “in our adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him.”66 The Court went on to quote Jus-
tice Sutherland’s powerful opinion in Powell v. Alabama, re-
minding all of its readers that criminal defendants “require[] 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the 
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish 
his innocence.”67 In so holding, the Court recognized the critical 
role that legal professionals play in maintaining fairness when 
the State wishes to deprive individuals of their fundamental 
rights.68 
1. Arguments Against Expanding the Right to Counsel: 
Sources of Hesitation 
With such importance placed on the right of the criminally 
accused to have counsel, it is difficult to see why the Court has 
not yet extended this guarantee of counsel to immigration de-
 
 66. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 67. Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
 68. Id. at 341. 
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tainees. For some, the argument is largely economic.69 Public 
defenders’ offices are already heavily overburdened.70 It would 
therefore be difficult for the system to take on a larger client 
base and thousands of additional cases per year. 
In response to such arguments, scholars have created pro-
jections of the economic impact of providing indigent immigra-
tion detainees with court-appointed counsel. In one such study, 
John Montgomery found that the “detention costs borne by the 
Federal government would decline by at least $173 to $174 mil-
lion per year, and likely substantially more.”71 This is because, 
under such a system, immigration cases could be more accu-
rately and expeditiously resolved.72 Beyond lowering the costs 
associated with detention, Montgomery estimates additional 
governmental savings totaling $31 to $34 million.73 There is 
consequently reason to doubt whether economic concerns about 
providing indigent immigration detainees with counsel would 
be as severe as sometimes proposed.74 
Others opposing a right to counsel for those in immigration 
proceedings emphasize that the stakes of immigration proceed-
ings are lower than the stakes in criminal proceedings. For in-
stance, criminal defendants face a number of damaging out-
comes including fines; collateral consequences such as 
ineligibility for administrative licensure or sex offender regis-
 
 69. See, e.g., Jon Feere, Illegal Immigrants Should Not Receive Taxpayer-
Subsidized Attorneys, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Mar. 15, 2016), https://cis.org/ 
Feere/Illegal-Immigrants-Should-Not-Receive-TaxpayerSubsidized-Attorneys 
(arguing that funding attorneys for indigent clients in immigration proceed-
ings is both unfair and may open the door for all civil proceedings to require 
court-appointed counsel). 
 70. Public defenders’ offices typically exceed national caseload standards, 
which are guidelines for the maximum number of cases any single attorney 
ought to handle in a single year. The result is that, by some measures, public 
defenders spend less than an hour per case on average. Laurence A. Benner, 
Eliminating Excessive Public Defender Workloads, 26 CRIM. JUST. 24, 25 
(2011). 
 71. JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, NERA ECONOMIC COUNSELING, COST OF 
COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL PROVIDING 
PUBLIC COUNSEL TO INDIGENT PERSONS SUBJECT TO IMMIGRATION REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS 3 (2014). 
 72. Id. at 4. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. As a result of such research, and recent increases in immigration en-
forcement efforts, some cities have implemented pilot programs that adopt a 
public defender style system for immigration detainees. Teresa Wiltz, Amid 
Immigration Crackdown, Cities Step In with Free Legal Aid, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/amid-immigration 
-crackdown-cities-step-in-with_free_us_ 5a046701e4b055de8d096af0. 
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tration; an abdication of their liberty for some period of time; 
or, in the most severe cases, death.75 In contrast, immigration 
detainees face only the possibility of relocation. In addition, a 
number of American citizens in important civil proceedings are 
not given a right to free counsel.76 When comparing the range 
of possible outcomes, some may argue, the possible outcomes 
that accused criminals face are more severe, thus requiring 
heightened due process protections. 
While these arguments make sense, they often oversimpli-
fy or minimize the consequences of “mere” relocation for noncit-
izens. In the same way that imprisonment may have dire eco-
nomic consequences for the family members of a person who is 
imprisoned, economic hardship falls on those whose family 
members are deported as a result of immigration proceedings.77 
Additionally, deported individuals may face violence and possi-
ble death upon returning to their country of citizenship.78 
There are significant reasons to believe that the stakes of im-
migration proceedings are sufficient to trigger due process pro-
tections, especially for lawful permanent residents or visa hold-
ers.79 The logic underlying the consequences-based distinction 
between criminal detainees and immigration detainees fails to 
establish a meaningful difference between the two. 
 
 75. See, e.g., Catherine E. Forrest, Collateral Consequences of a Criminal 
Conviction: Impact on Corrections and Reentry, CORRECTIONS TODAY (2016), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249734.pdf (describing various other conse-
quences of a criminal conviction). 
 76. For a description of this argument, see Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, 
Immigrant Detainees and the Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/sunday-review/immigrant-detainees-and 
-the-right-to-counsel.html. 
 77. In a recent study, researchers found that during detention, the fami-
lies of roughly sixty-four percent of immigration detainees missed rent, mort-
gage, or utility payments. CAITLIN PATLER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LONG-
TERM IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 3 (2015). The study 
concluded that “[l]ong-term immigration detention . . . appears to significantly 
impact the economic status not just of individual detainees, but also of entire 
households.” Id. at 4. 
 78. Some scholars argue that the stakes of immigration proceedings are, 
in fact, even higher than those of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Peter L. 
Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to 
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 350–51 (2008). 
 79. Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Res-
idents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394, 2414 (2013). 
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2. Why the Right to Counsel Matters for Immigration 
Detainees 
Much like the criminal justice system prior to Gideon v. 
Wainwright, the current immigration system is experiencing 
important consequences for not ensuring a right to counsel. In 
response, a number of legal scholars have debated the relative 
merits of government-provided counsel to immigrant detain-
ees.80 In order to fully understand these discussions, it is vital 
to understand the consequences of the status quo on the immi-
gration system. 
One of the most direct consequences is the rate of repre-
sentation for those in immigration proceedings. Between 2007 
and 2012, sixty-three percent of immigration detainees repre-
sented themselves without the assistance of counsel at any 
point in their proceedings.81 This matters because outcomes 
significantly differ between immigration detainees who obtain 
representation and those who do not. For example, one study 
found that “[d]epending on custody status, representation was 
associated with a nineteen to forty-three percentage point boost 
in rate of case success.”82 The types of relief sought also differ 
based on whether an immigrant is advised by counsel as op-
posed to merely questioned by an immigration judge during pro 
se proceedings.83 
Ultimately, many of the same considerations that led the 
Supreme Court to announce a right to counsel for all criminal 
detainees in Gideon v. Wainwright would similarly justify a due 
process right to counsel for immigration detainees. Though 
there are pragmatic considerations that may make it difficult to 
provide counsel, such a right could be an important component 
of providing immigration detainees with meaningful access to 
 
 80. E.g., Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal Pro-
ceedings, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 169 (2010); Charles Gordon, Right to Coun-
sel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1961); Beth J. Werlin, 
Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation 
Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000). 
 81. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Coun-
sel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV 1, 16 (2015). 
 82. Id. at 49 (“Put another way, detained respondents, when compared to 
their pro se counterparts, were ten-and-a-half times more likely to succeed, 
released respondents were five-and-a-half times more likely to succeed, and 
never detained respondents were three-and-a-half times more likely to suc-
ceed.”). The authors of this study note, however, the data may be more nu-
anced and further divided based on the type of cases, nationality of those rep-
resented, and source of representation. Id. at 54–58. 
 83. Id. at 29. 
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the courts. Just as the Supreme Court announced that the 
stakes of criminal trials were too great to allow indigent de-
fendants to proceed without counsel, so too, the Court should 
find that the stakes of immigration proceedings are significant 
enough to trigger a right to counsel. 
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES 
Because there is no existing right to counsel in immigra-
tion proceedings, other solutions have been proposed. Many of 
these additional safeguards call on administrative agencies to 
protect the rights of immigration detainees. Some of these solu-
tions are beneficial, but by and large, they are insufficient to 
fully ensure a fair process for immigrants facing deportation. 
Courts and Congress have both imposed procedural re-
quirements with the goal of alleviating the most glaring prob-
lems with the immigration detention system.84 Many of these 
safeguards relate to pro se defendants.85 For example, when 
dealing with pro se detainees, immigration judges have an obli-
gation to thoroughly explain the procedures, and ask questions 
aimed at identifying avenues of relief.86 This includes providing 
detainees with relief applications, adequate time for the de-
tainee to fully complete the application, and, sometimes, legal 
resources to assist detainees in completing the applications.87 
Immigration judges must also consider the mental competency 
of detainees to stand trial.88 In addition, all immigration de-
tainees must be provided with a list of low-cost and free legal 
 
 84. For a compiled list of various protections, see CHERI L. HO, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: SELECTED TOPICS (2016), https://www.ca9 
.uscourts.gov/guides/immigration_outline.php (Select “PDF” for “Due Process 
in Immigration Proceedings” to view the compiled list. Alternatively, to view 
title page information about the outline, select “PDF” for “Cover Page.”) (de-
tailing both an immigrant’s rights during her proceedings, as well as certain 
obligations that immigration judges must meet in order to satisfy constitu-
tional requirements). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 75–76 (2017). 
 87. See id. at 6–7. 
 88. Mimi E. Tsankov, Incompetent Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 
IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Apr. 2009, at 1; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMI-
GRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, PART I: OVERVIEW AND COMPARISONS OF MEN-
TAL HEALTH ISSUES, https://web.archive.org/web/20171208123917/www.justice 
.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook-mental-health-issues (As of publication 
of this Note, the benchbook is no longer available on the Justice Department 
website.). 
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resources within their community for their proceedings.89 
These requirements are meant to inject some level of procedur-
al and substantive protections for immigration detainees. 
While the aforementioned requirements represent an im-
provement from prior proceedings, administrative deficiencies 
still plague the system. For instance, the average length of time 
that an immigration detainee spends in ICE custody is eighty-
one days for those awaiting removal determinations, seventy-
two days for those who have received final removal orders, and 
114 days for those who have received post-removal orders.90 
During this time, many immigration detainees are not given 
resources to fight their cases. 
In response to the recent uptick in prolonged periods of de-
tention, many advocacy groups have initiated specific outreach 
measures for those who are detained for prolonged periods of 
time.91 Though federal habeas corpus petitions have not been 
resoundingly successful, class action proceedings have been.92 
However, private-sector advocacy groups and non-profit organi-
zations are currently filling the gap in resources for immigra-
tion detainees. Just as courts stepped in to require the govern-
ment to provide resources in criminal cases, the courts should 
also require the government to address resources and fairness 
issues within the immigration detention system. 
C. THE CURRENT STATUS OF LAW LIBRARIES 
One of the primary ways that the criminal justice system 
dealt with procedural inadequacies—particularly in the appel-
late and post-conviction stages of criminal cases where there is 
no guarantee of court-appointed counsel—was the requirement 
that all prisons provide either rudimentary law libraries or le-
gal assistance to assist criminal defendants in filing claims.93 
 
 89. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.61(a), 1292.2(a) (2017). 
 90. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: 
THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 9 (2015). 
 91. See, e.g., ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT, ISSUE BRIEF: PRO-
LONGED IMMIGRATION DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING 
REMOVAL (2009) (detailing the problems of prolonged immigration detention 
and advocating for possible government solutions). 
 92. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 93. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding “that the fun-
damental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authori-
ties to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers 
by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance 
from persons trained in the law”). But see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 363–
64 (1996) (overturning the Ninth Circuit’s finding of a Bounds violation). 
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Federal courts have largely allowed states to determine the 
breadth and depth of these law libraries, though the Supreme 
Court has ruled that legal resources must be provided to in-
mates at all stages of the criminal process. 
Prisoner law libraries are controversial. Some find that law 
libraries provide inmates with an invaluable resource to protect 
their rights, giving significant autonomy for prisoners to de-
termine the course of their cases on appeal.94 Others argue that 
law libraries are insufficient procedural safeguards against a 
deeply flawed justice system.95 Despite the discussion sur-
rounding law libraries, courts and scholars nationwide have re-
iterated the central role they may play in providing prisoners 
with meaningful access to the courts.96 
The system of prison law libraries is not uniform. Each 
state has faced its own challenges, and developed its own solu-
tions. For instance, some prisons allow inmates to request aca-
demic research material from off-site libraries through interli-
brary loan programs.97 Others train certain inmates to help 
others with legal research, using primarily volumes located 
 
 94. See Mona Lynch, Books Behind Bars: The War on Prison Law Librar-
ies, CHANGING LIVES, CHANGING MINDS (Mar. 18, 2009), https://cltlblog 
.wordpress.com/2009/03/18/books-behind-bars-the-war-on-prison-law-libraries; 
see also Joseph A. Schouten, Not So Meaningful Anymore: Why a Law Library 
Is Required to Make a Prisoner ’s Access to the Courts Meaningful, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1195 (2004). 
 95. This is particularly true in the wake of Lewis v. Casey, which estab-
lished a showing of actual prejudice to be a prerequisite to bringing a constitu-
tional claim that a prisoner ’s access to the courts was being restrained. 518 
U.S. 343 (1996). Even before Lewis v. Casey, many scholars were pessimistic 
about what role the access-to-the-courts standard would play in protecting the 
rights of prisoners. See, e.g., Arturo A. Flores, Bounds and Reality: Lawbooks 
Alone Do Not a Lawyer Make, 77 L. LIBR. J. 275 (1984) (calling into question 
“the effectiveness with which inmates can use law libraries in their attempts 
to prepare and file meaningful legal papers and, even more importantly, to 
question the concept of gaining access to the courts by virtue of having access 
to law libraries”). For further explanations of the shortcomings of the current 
structure of prison law libraries, see Abel, supra note 48. 
 96. See Morris L. Cohen, Reading Law in Prison, 48 PRISON J. 21, 25 
(1968). For a perspective that prison libraries can provide benefits to the legal 
cases as well as the psyche of inmates themselves, see Louie L. Wainwright, 
Dir., Fla. Div. of Corrs., Legal Information and Resources for Inmates, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NINETY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTION OF THE 
AMERICAN CORRECTION ASSOCIATION 235 (1966). 
 97. For a discussion of these systems, see Curt Asher, Interlibrary Loan 
Outreach to a Prison: Access Inside, 16 J. INTERLIBRARY LOAN, DOCUMENT 
DELIVERY & ELECTRONIC RES. 27 (2006). 
 1724 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1703 
 
within the facility.98 Regardless of what form they take, prison 
law libraries have increased the ability of inmates to research 
their own cases and protect their own rights. Based on the suc-
cess that prison law libraries have had in protecting the rights 
of criminal detainees, a similar system should be adopted for 
immigration detainees. 
III.  HOW ACCESS MAY MANIFEST ITSELF: MODELS AND 
MOVING FORWARD   
As with many systemic legal problems, the issues facing 
immigration detainees are complex and not easily solved. In a 
similar vein to the criminal justice system, reforms to the im-
migration detention system will be incremental, and procedural 
safeguards may not fully solve the problem. However, by recog-
nizing and understanding the similarities between what is at 
stake in the immigration detention system and the criminal 
justice system, extending due process protections to immigra-
tion detainees becomes a logical solution. 
This Part will focus on the two prongs of meaningful access 
to the courts as articulated in Lewis v. Casey: access to legal 
representation and access to law libraries.99 The Supreme 
Court has ruled that either one of these prongs Lewis v. Casey 
can be used to satisfy due process, so this Part will discuss each 
in turn.100 After a brief discussion of the right to counsel in 
immigration proceedings in Section A, Section B will discuss 
law libraries tailored to immigration detention. Section C will 
detail pragmatic ways that existing law libraries may be ex-
panded or changed so that they better meet the needs of immi-
gration detainees. Then, Section D will discuss why giving im-
migration detainees access to the courts is vital. 
A. INCREASING ATTORNEY ACCESS 
As previously discussed,101 the immigration system has a 
troublingly low proportion of representation and does not pro-
vide counsel for indigent detainees.102 Though there are finan-
 
 98. See, e.g., Library Services: General Library Program, N.Y. DEP’T OF 
CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/ProgramServices/ 
library.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
 99. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Supra Part II.A. 
 102. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 81 (analyzing the access to counsel in 
United States immigration courts). 
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cial and practical concerns animating the debate as to whether 
immigration detainees ought to have the same right to an at-
torney as criminal defendants, an analysis of the reasoning be-
hind Gideon v. Wainwright reveals that the distinction between 
these two groups is largely arbitrary.103 
Ensuring the same broad access to, say, public defenders 
may not be feasible in the immigration detention system.104 
The current public defender systems are notoriously overbur-
dened and undersupported.105 While ideally there may be a 
way to integrate the criminal justice system and immigration 
detention system, the reality is that this sort of expansion of le-
gal representation is not feasible at this time. There are signifi-
cant challenges to increasing the right to counsel, including the 
current political landscape, funding structures of public de-
fenders’ offices, and the decentralized nature of immigration 
detention.106 With this in mind, the second prong of the Lewis 
v. Casey requirement of allowing defendants meaningful access 
to the courts is a more promising solution for protecting the due 
process rights of immigration detainees.107 
B. BROADENING EXISTING LAW LIBRARIES 
The legacies of both Bounds and Lewis v. Casey establish 
that providing prisoners with resources related to their cases, 
the laws they are charged with violating, and procedural re-
quirements of the legal system are crucial to protect due pro-
cess.108 Law libraries serve many crucial functions for those in 
 
 103. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 104. For an argument that notwithstanding the potential challenges court-
appointed counsel should be provided to indigent immigration clients who are 
not permitted bond hearings, see Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Dep-
rivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immi-
grants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012). 
 105. See Benner, supra note 70 (detailing the excessive workloads burden-
ing public defenders). 
 106. In 2013, New York City began a program called the New York Immi-
grant Family Unit Program to provide lawyers to indigent immigrants in re-
moval proceedings. The program was successful enough in its first year to get 
public funding and inspire other cities to begin similar pilot programs. Tiziana 
Rinaldi, In New York City, Lawyers Make All the Difference for Immigrant De-
tainees Facing Deportation, PRI’S THE WORLD (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www 
.pri.org/stories/2016-09-20/new-york-city-lawyers-make-all-difference 
-immigrant-detainees-facing-deportation. 
 107. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
 108. Id.; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (“The right of access to the courts . . . is founded in 
the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the oppor-
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prison, including educating prisoners about their avenues of 
appeal, legal challenges to their convictions, and how to navi-
gate the criminal justice system.109 Prison law libraries also 
signal to criminal defendants that even after their right to 
counsel ends, the State is willing to provide them with tools to 
protect their fundamental rights. 
There is a parallel need in the immigration system for legal 
research resources. Immigration detainees face many of the 
same challenges as criminal detainees. Notably, both categories 
of individuals experience restrictions on their basic right to lib-
erty—particularly in the case of immigration detainees who are 
held without bond hearings, despite completion of their crimi-
nal sentences. It is nonsensical to imprison individuals, charge 
them with violating the law, and hinder their ability to mount a 
defense simply because their violation is civil rather than crim-
inal. 
It is worth repeating that immigration detainees are fre-
quently held in the same facilities as those in the criminal jus-
tice system.110 Thus, some immigration detainees enjoy access 
to prison law libraries; however these law libraries are primari-
ly geared toward criminal law. The American Association of 
Law Libraries (AALL) is an organization that releases lists of 
recommended materials for prison law libraries.111 A majority 
of these recommendations are criminal statutes, selected crim-
inal cases from the Supreme Court and circuit courts, criminal 
trial manuals, and criminal procedure rulebooks.112 These lists 
 
tunity to present the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights.”). 
 109. See generally Robert M. Stearns, The Prison Library: An Issue for Cor-
rections, or a Correct Solution for Its Issues?, 23 BEHAV. & SOC. SCI. LIBR., no. 
1, 2004, at 49 (discussing various functions of prison law libraries including 
“ways the prison library can become part of the effort to enhance public safe-
ty”). 
 110. Dagmar R. Myslinska, Living Conditions in Immigration Detention 
Centers, NOLO https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/living-conditions 
-immigration-detention-centers.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
 111. Historically, a large number of organizations released lists of recom-
mended resources for inclusion in criminally focused law libraries. For a dis-
cussion of the relative merits of each of these lists, see O. James Werner, Law 
Libraries for Correctional Facilities, LIBR. TRENDS, Summer 1977, at 71, 83–93 
(1977). 
 112. See AM. ASS’N OF LAW LIBRARIES, RECOMMENDED COLLECTIONS FOR 
PRISON AND OTHER INSTITUTION LAW LIBRARIES & GUIDELINES FOR PRISON 
LAW LIBRARIES (Rebecca S. Trammell ed. 1996) [hereinafter RECOMMENDED 
COLLECTIONS 1996], https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/ 
Recommended%20Collections%20for%20Prisons%20A.A.L.L.%201996.pdf. For 
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do not include important sources of immigration law and pro-
cess, such as precedential Board of Immigration Appeals deci-
sions, persuasive immigration court decisions, administrative 
agency guidance, enforcement priority memoranda, and proce-
dural guides for immigration court.113 
Further, immigration detainees who wish to use law librar-
ies face various barriers.114 There are many constraints on how 
many inmates can use the law library at a particular time, how 
long the inmates will be allowed to conduct research, and what 
materials they are allowed to copy.115 The competition for re-
sources illustrates a need to create and allocate resources spe-
cific to immigration detainees, or otherwise expand existing 
criminal law libraries to better serve both criminal and immi-
grant populations. 
There are a few possible explanations for why existing 
criminal law libraries have not become immigration law friend-
ly. First, unlike criminal law, immigration law is largely 
shaped by administrative agencies, including the Department 
of Homeland Security and its subsidiaries. Administrative 
guidance, unlike criminal statutes and case law, comes in many 
forms.116 Thus, choosing what information to include in an im-
migration-focused law library may pose a problem.117 However, 
in the same way that criminal-focused law libraries have been 
guided by best-practices memoranda, immigration-focused law 
libraries could also seek input from different legal research or-
 
an earlier iteration of this list, see AM. ASS’N OF LAW LIBRARIES, RECOM-
MENDED COLLECTIONS FOR PRISON LAW LIBRARIES (1975), https://ia800305.us 
.archive.org/34/items/ERIC_ED114083/ERIC_ED114083.pdf. 
 113. See RECOMMENDED COLLECTIONS 1996, supra note 112. 
 114. S. POVERTY LAW CTR. ET AL., SHADOW PRISONS: IMMIGRANT DETEN-
TION IN THE SOUTH 23 (Nov. 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/ijp_shadow_prisons_immigrant_detention_report.pdf (describing a host of 
issues that immigration detainees face, including prison guards not respond-
ing to their requests and outdated factual information). 
 115. Id. at 10 (describing the barriers that immigration detainees face 
when trying to use law libraries for their own cases). 
 116. For a discussion of the robust network of sources of immigration law, 
as well as a critique of the central role administrative law plays, see Michael 
Kagan, Immigration Law Is Torn Between Administrative Law and Criminal 
Law, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 12, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/ 
nc/immigration-law-is-torn-between-administrative-law-and-criminal-law-by 
-michael-kagan. 
 117. Existing prison law libraries also face challenges regarding what re-
sources to include. However, in the same way that the AALL has compiled 
master lists of resources to guide prison officials, a master list of immigration 
resources could be created and circulated. See supra note 112 and accompany-
ing text. 
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ganizations to determine what resources are most central for 
immigration detainees.118 
Second, because many facilities house individuals who are 
in both immigration removal proceedings and criminal proceed-
ings, prisons will need to determine how to allocate limited fi-
nancial resources.119 Some facilities may find separation of 
immigration libraries and criminal libraries to be beneficial, 
while others may simply broaden the scope of their existing law 
libraries. Either solution will have costs and benefits; however, 
just as current law libraries do not follow a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach, each facility can make this determination based on 
their populations, resources, and unique circumstances. 
Finally, there are reasons to believe that an immigration 
law library would fall short of the lofty goal of a procedurally 
perfect immigration detention system. After all, there has been 
ongoing criticism of criminal law libraries since their introduc-
tion in the wake of Bounds.120 The efficacy, role, and burden of 
such law libraries have been evaluated at length. Despite its 
inability to fix every issue underlying the immigration system, 
providing immigration detainees with access to well-created 
law libraries would represent a concrete step toward increased 
respect for due process rights, more fair outcomes, and a more 
legitimate immigration process than the status quo. 
C. PROGRESS OVER PERFECTION 
Notwithstanding the questions and concerns outlined in 
Part II.B, immigration-focused law libraries would bring a 
number of benefits to the troubled American immigration sys-
tem. The successes of law libraries in the criminal justice sys-
 
 118. Research institutions already compile immigration regulations, rules, 
and decisions into sourcebooks for practitioners in the immigration field. See, 
e.g., IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK (15th ed. 
2016). 
 119. Indeed, in many facilities, prison law libraries themselves are consid-
ered multipurpose rooms rather than dedicated spaces for inmate research. 
See, e.g., S. POVERTY LAW CTR. ET AL., supra note 114 at 64. In addition, prison 
officials have claimed that staffing supervisors while prisoners want to use the 
law libraries is too financially burdensome. As a result, many of the immi-
grants, as well as criminal defendants, who wish to use these resources are 
given a narrow window of time to do so. Id. Low-cost alternatives, such as 
partnering with external law libraries to loan resources to prisons, could help 
mitigate this problem. 
 120. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Some scholars have critiqued 
prison law libraries as diminishing, rather than enhancing, the ability of de-
tainees to engage in the court system. See Abel, supra note 48, at 1175–76. 
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tem may transfer well into immigration detention, helping to 
alleviate some of the due process issues that currently exist 
within the immigration system. 
First and foremost, any guarantee of research resources 
will be an improvement from the status quo.121 Immigration 
detainees are currently given sparse resources, including the 
forms they need to fill out and lists of low cost or free legal re-
sources.122 Though these are important resources, they fall 
short of protecting the rights of all immigration detainees. Hav-
ing an immigration-focused law library would better ensure 
that all immigration detainees have the ability to understand 
the charges against them and argue any meritorious defense 
that they may have. 
Second, by allowing immigration detainees to fully develop 
their cases, the result of immigration proceedings will be more 
fair. In the status quo, pro se defendants have a limited ability 
to check government arguments. By contrast, when both sides 
have well-tailored resources at their disposal, the result is a 
fairer process.123 Immigration detainees would be able to fully 
explore all avenues of relief. They would no longer have to de-
pend on agents of the government to inform them of their 
rights and remedies. Instead, they would have independent re-
sources from which they could determine the best course of ac-
tion for their cases. 
Finally, by introducing immigration-inclusive law libraries, 
the entire immigration system will be perceived as more legit-
imate. In the status quo, organizations constantly identify pro-
cedural unfairness within the immigration system.124 These is-
 
 121. See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 122. The Executive Office for Immigration Review creates and revises this 
list, which is provided to immigration detainees at the beginning of their pro-
ceedings. See List of Pro Bono Legal Service Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/list-pro-bono-legal-service-providers (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2018). However, many immigration detainees, especially outside of 
large cities, have great difficulty accessing these resources. Cf. INGRID EAGLY 
& STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMI-
GRATION COURT 2 (2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/ 
default/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf. 
 123. Access to equal information is seen as a fundamental part of fairness 
in the criminal law context. This idea is what lead the Supreme Court to its 
conclusion in Brady v. Maryland, which held that prosecutors must disclose 
exculpatory information to criminal defendants. 373 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1963). 
 124. See Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror: Discovery in 
Immigration Court, 79 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1569 (2014) (detailing the lack of 
meaningful discovery in immigration court cases); Rob Garver, U.S. Immigra-
tion Court’s Dirty Secret, FISCAL TIMES (July 30, 2014), http://www 
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sues tend to stem from a common problem: immigration de-
tainees are not provided with sufficient resources to argue their 
cases. Law libraries will resolve issues related to a lack of re-
sources, and the immigration system will experience a corre-
sponding increase in perceived legitimacy. 
D. THE MECHANISM QUESTION: HOW TO CREATE LASTING 
CHANGE 
Identifying positive changes to immigration detention and 
understanding how they will protect the rights of noncitizens is 
one element of meaningful change. Beyond the “what” of immi-
gration detention reform, there remains a question of “how.” In 
this regard, there are a number of actors that have the ability 
to implement such reforms. Each layer of immigration policy 
can be a part of protecting the due process rights of immigra-
tion detainees, and ensuring that immigration law libraries 
meet the needs of detainees. 
First, courts have a critical role to play in protecting the 
rights of noncitizens. As in the case of so many constitutional 
protections, court rulings can institute significant, sweeping 
change while still allowing legislatures to determine the me-
chanics of implementation. However, because of the length of 
time it can take a case to be resolved and finalized, relying sole-
ly on judicial pronouncements of stronger due process protec-
tions for noncitizens is not ideal. Instead, court decisions 
should be a single component of a broader scheme of change. 
Legislative reform is also an important part of protecting 
the rights of noncitizens. Passing well-crafted laws ensures 
that elected officials discuss and debate how to solve problems, 
which leads to a better-reasoned result. However, as history 
has repeatedly demonstrated, comprehensive immigration re-
form is not often accomplished.125 It would therefore be unwise 
to rely only on legislative change as a way to reform due pro-
 
.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/07/30/US-Immigration-Court-s-Dirty-Secret; 
Kristy Siegfried, The Big Unfairness in America’s Asylum System, IRIN (June 
23, 2016), http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/23/big-unfairness 
-america’s-asylum-system; Batya Ungar-Sargon, Heavy Burdens and Unfair 
Fights in Immigration Courts, CITY LIMITS (Dec. 17, 2015), https://citylimits 
.org/2015/12/17/heavy-burdens-and-unfair-fights-in-immigration-courts. 
 125. For a discussion of failed attempts at legislative reform of the immi-
gration system, see Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and 
Over, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the 
-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-failed-over-and-over (identifying 
and describing five recent failures of Congress to make legislative change in 
the realm of immigration). 
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cess rights in the immigration system, though legislation would 
provide another layer of permanence to the changes established 
in other parts of government. 
A third option would be for administrative agencies to ex-
pand the protections of immigration detainees. However, the 
agencies with the most authority over immigration detention—
the Department of Homeland Security and its subsidiaries—
have not historically concerned themselves with the constitu-
tional rights of noncitizens.126 Thus, if the administrative sys-
tem were to play a role in immigration reform, it would likely 
be through bodies not traditionally associated with immigra-
tion, such as the Department of Justice. 
In sum, there is not one, single medium through which an 
expansion of the rights afforded to detained immigrants should 
take place. Neither the courts, nor the legislature, nor the ad-
ministrative system acting alone provides a perfect method for 
expansion or protection of due process protections for nonciti-
zens. Rather, each actor can make important contributions to 
establish and protect the right of immigration detainees to 
meaningfully access the courts. Courts themselves can create 
judicial precedent. Legislators at every level can introduce and 
support laws that would codify increased due process protec-
tions. Administrative agencies can promulgate rules and guid-
ance that advocate for stronger respect for the rights of immi-
gration detainees to access legal resources. Together, each of 
these actors can play a role in expanding respect for due pro-
cess within the immigration system. 
  CONCLUSION   
One of the fundamental tenets of the American criminal 
justice system is the guarantee for all criminal defendants that 
they will have some level of procedural and substantive due 
process protections afforded to them. The Supreme Court has 
recognized a number of ways in which the court system must 
do this, including providing court-appointed counsel to indigent 
defendants and providing individuals with meaningful access to 
 
 126. In fact, the Department of Homeland Security and ICE have both 
faced substantial criticism for violating the rights of noncitizens in their cus-
tody. For example, a number of civil rights groups have started investigating 
the mistreatment of noncitizens in detention. See, e.g., US: Deaths in Immi-
gration Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 7, 2016) https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2016/07/07/us-deaths-immigration-detention; see also California: ICE 
and Border Patrol Abuses, ACLU SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL CTYS. (Mar. 14, 
2016), https://www.aclusandiego.org/california-ice-border-patrol-abuses. 
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the courts. Prison law libraries have served to protect the due 
process rights of criminal defendants since their introduction 
decades ago. Law libraries give prisoners resources to appeal 
their cases when the right to counsel ends, signal that after tri-
al inmates retain rights that the government may not infringe 
upon, and prevent the prosecutorial arm of the government 
from exercising unchecked discretion. 
In consideration of the stakes of immigration proceedings, 
it is difficult to understand why similar due process protections 
have not been provided to individuals in immigration deten-
tion. Though the American legal system considers immigration 
proceedings to be civil rather than criminal in nature, this rhe-
torical distinction has been inappropriately used to deny fun-
damental due process rights to immigration detainees. Courts 
and legislatures alike should therefore extend the right of 
meaningful access to the courts to immigration detainees in the 
form of immigration-focused law libraries. Though such an ex-
pansion of due process will have complications, it will have a 
corresponding deluge of benefits in the form of higher respect 
for individual rights, more responsible governance, and fairer 
immigration proceedings. 
